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Abstract
This Note will examine the validity of the Convention’s objective contract approach to defin-
ing “international transportation.” Although the Convention’s requirements will be discussed sep-
arately, the focus will be upon the ”regulated contract” and the relationship between article 1 and
article 3 of the Convention. The need for revising the Convention will be discussed and a proposal
for a new definition of ”international transportation” will be made.
UP IN THE AIR WITHOUT A TICKET: INTERPRETATION
AND REVISION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention system' limits an airline's liability
2
for injuries sustained by "international"3 air travelers. Application
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter cited a' Warsaw Convention]. The only official text is in French. This Note
will use the United States' translation.
The United States' continued adherence to the treaty is based upon the private agree-
ment called the Montreal Agreement. CAB Agreement No. 18,900, reprinted in 2 C.
SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW D43-49 (4th ed. 1982) (with list of member carriers)
(approved by CAB Order No. E-23,680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966)) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement]. This interim arrangement allows passengers to recover up to
U.S.$75,000 and requires the airlines to waive the Convention's "due care" defense. Id. § 1.
Moreover, the carrier must "at the time of delivery of the ticket," provide each passenger
with a "notice" that the Convention may be applicable. Id. § 2. The "notice" must be in at
least 10 point type and in contrasting colors. Id. By securing a uniform standard of notice, the
Montreal Agreement allows the courts to make a swift determination of the parties' rights and
liabilities. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 838 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
The Montreal Agreement is a "special contract" between passenger and carrier. Warsaw
Convention, supra, art. 22(1). The CAB has promulgated rules to preempt state and local
law. Both parties are conclusively presumed to have assented to the terms of the "special
contract," notwithstanding the parties' lack of actual consent. Waiver of Warsaw Conven-
tion Limits and Defenses, 48 Fed. Reg. 8042 (1983)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 203)(effec-
tive Mar. 26, 1983); see 47 Fed. Reg. 25,019 (1982) (notice of proposed rulemaking); see also
Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, 48 Fed. Reg. 6317 (1983)(to be codified at 14
C.F.R. § 253)(effective Feb. 11, 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 28,681-82 (1982)(notice of proposed
rulemaking, to require two separate "conspicuous" written notices of contract terms); see
generally Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976), amended by 49 U.S.C. §
1551 (Supp. 1978)(CAB authority to regulate).
2. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. The limit of 125,000 French Poincare
(Gold) Francs originally converted into U.S.$4,898. Reilly, The Warsaw Ticket to Judicial
Treaty Revision-Will We Do It Again?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 396, 397 n.4 (1969). In 1933,
with the devaluation of the United States dollar, the limit was U.S.$8,955.21. I L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.03 (Supp. 1981). The fluctuations have continued.
1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUsE, AVIATION TowR LAW § 11.36 (1978); see infra note 126.
Only the "carrier" is protected by the Convention's limits of liability. Now other
defendants such as manufacturers or governmental units are sued in disaster cases. This
development in the law was unforeseen by the drafters of the Convention. See SECOND
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW, OCTOBER 4-12, 1929, WARSAW (MINUTES)
20-22 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1975)[hereinafter cited as MINUTES]; see, e.g., In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975)(203 suits by 337
decedents primarily against the manufacturer), cited in Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1091
(2d Cir. 1977); see also Kennelly, Aviation Law: International Air Travel-A Brief Diagnosis
and Prognosis, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 86, 95-97 (1975).
WARSAW CONVENTION
of the Convention is based solely upon the passenger ticket, a
"regulated contract"' 4 between the passenger and the carrier. 5 Both
the advantages and the disadvantages of using the contract to deter-
mine the applicability of the Convention have long been recog-
nized.6 Recently, the problems with this system were highlighted in
Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines.7
The issue in Stratis was whether the passenger was engaged in
"international transportation" while flying from New Orleans to
New York. Ultimately, Stratis was to return to Greece, but his
The term "carrier" includes the airline's employees and agents. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
at 1092-93; see Protocol Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, art. XIV, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 383
(limits on liability apply to servant or agent acting within the scope of his employment)[he-
reinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
3. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. See MINUTES, supra note 2, at 19, 153; see
also infra note 24.
4. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3. See MINUTES, supra note 2, at 22.
Application of the Convention is based solely upon the passenger ticket. Id. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 500-01
(1967). The Convention regulates the terms and legal effect of this standard form contract.
MINUTES, supra note 2, at 42 (Mr. Dennis, Great Britain: Convention replaces the rule of
freedom of contract with international regulation); see Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,
preamble; see also Letter of Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Senator Wheeler (Aug. 19.
1935), reprinted in 79 CONG. REc. 13,987-88 (1935)(one of the most important functions of
the Convention was to regulate the "form and legal effect" of the contract). The Convention
establishes a contract approach similar to the objective theory of contract law. The approach
is based upon the legal meaning of the French term stipulations ("contract" in the United
States translation) used throughout the text. See G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 88 (1977) ("regulated contracts, such as the contract of carriage by air, are quite
common in France."); see also Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir.
1967)("binding meaning of the terms [of the Convention] is the French legal meaning"), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). The rule is to be applied uniformly by courts of the High
Contracting Parties in all matters concerning contracts for "international transportation."
Grein v. Imperial Airways, [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 74-75 (C.A. 1936).
5. The Convention also applies to the carriage of goods by air. Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, arts. 4, 22.
6. See Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention,
7 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 6-13 (1936).
This emphasis upon the intention of the parties permits a certainty in the applica-
tion of the Convention, and makes it unaffected by an incidental occurence .... A
disadvantage of using the contract of the parties as the determinative factor, rather
than . .. nationality of the aircraft (the suggestion of the Brazilian delegation) is
that in one accident the liability of the carrier to different passengers may be
governed by different laws.
Id. at 6-7. There is also "the difficulty in proving what the parties intended .... Perhaps
these difficulties are unavoidable." Id. at 10-11.
7. Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'g, 75 Civ. 1151
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)(not officially reported); see Sullivan, supra note 6, at 6-13; see also supra
note 4.
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ticket with Eastern Air Lines authorized purely domestic carriage.,
The circuit court's interpretation of the Convention broadens its
application to domestic flights. 9 The court's analysis raises doubts
concerning the vitality of the Convention's fifty year old "regulated
contract,"' 1 and brings to light the disadvantages of the present
definition of international transportation which seriously affects
travelers on domestic flights."
This Note will examine the validity of the Convention's objec-
tive contract approach to defining "international transportation." 12
Although the Convention's requirements will be discussed sepa-
rately, 13 the focus will be upon the "regulated contract" and the
relationship between article 1 and article 3 of the Convention. 14
The need for revising the Convention will be discussed and a pro-
posal for a new definition of "international transportation" will be
made. 15
I. EVOLUTION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. The Warsaw Convention
The essential purpose of the Convention was to provide the
world's fledgling airline industry with a "legal basis" for its opera-
8. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 408-12. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 91. Application of the Convention's limitations to domestic travel has
never been necessary to achieve the Convention's purpose. See infra note 17. Today, although
few passengers are aware of it, the distinction between "international" and "domestic"
transportation can produce a staggering difference in the amount recoverable from carriers.
For example, if Eastern had been the only responsible defendant, the plaintiff in Stratis
would have been unable to recover over U.S.$1,000,000 in damages. See infra note 78; see
also infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
10. The developments in contract law and ticketing technology have left the "regulated
contract" a relic of the past. See Hague Protocol, supra note 3; Guatemala City Protocol,
infra note 119; Montreal Protocols, infra note 146. The United States, however, continues to
adhere to the original Convention. The courts are thus confronted with the problem of
applying the Convention in light of present day practices. The results have been inconsistent,
undermining the certainty which the Convention sought to introduce to the law governing
contracts for international transportation. See infra note 58.
11. See infra notes 126-32.
12. See infra notes 33-45.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 68-88, 104-16.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53, 89-98, 117-21.
15. See injra text accompanying notes 122-59.
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tion. 16 To achieve this goal, the Convention had to clarify the law
governing international flights.17 The Convention, therefore, has
established an "international code declaring the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties to contracts of international carriage by air."18
The Convention creates an unambiguous system' 9 of limited
carrier liability 20 based solely upon the contract of carriage. 21 To
reduce the potential inequality of bargaining power between the
16. MINUTES, supra note 2, at 13, 18-23. Private investors and insurance companies
feared the uncertainty in the law governing international flights. See Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 4, at 499-500 (explaining Secretary of State Cordell Hull's Message
transmitting the Convention, infra note 54). Potential liability for a single accident was
staggering. Id. Moreover, litigation practices and laws would vary depending upon where
the suit was brought. See id. at 498-99. The Convention, by eliminating the uncertainty in
the law governing the contracts for international transportation, encourages the parties to
settle their rights and liabilities before the flight. The "legal basis" for operation enabled the
airline industry to obtain insurance and secure private investment. See Dunn v. TWA, 589
F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1089-93, Block v. Compagnie
Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F.2d at 327 (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull's Message transmitting
the Convention, infra note 54). See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 497-500.
The Convention is often compared to the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976),
which limits the recovery for injuries resulting from nuclear power plant accidents. See In re
Aircrash Disaster in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982).
17. Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 74-75. "There was no necessity for any agreement as to
carriage performed within the territory of one State ...." Id. at 76. The drafters also
recognized that limiting the liability of an "influential and economically strong" airline
industry "would be inequitable and could influence negatively the development of air
carriage." MINUTES, supra note 2, at 39 (Mr. Sabanin, U.S.S.R.).
18. Id. at 75. "The desirability of such an international code for air carriage is apparent.
Without it questions of great difficulty as to the law applicable to a contract of international
carriage by air would constantly arise." Id. See supra note 16.
19. See MINUTES, supra note 2, at 153 (Mr. Pittard, Switzerland: "We must give the
public rules which it understands.").
20. The Convention establishes a presumption of carrier liability as a quid pro quo for
limiting the passenger's recovery. MINUTES, supra note 2, at 37-39; Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 4, at 500. It can be argued that the Convention is self-executing and
creates its own cause of action which, however, is not exclusive. See Benjamins v. British Eur.
Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Hill v.
United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982). See also Calkins, The Cause of
Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. Am L. & COM. 217, 323 (1959)(parts one and
two). But see Maugnie v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.2 (9th Cir.) ("It is
true that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action, but merely creates a
presumption of liability if the otherwise applicable substantive law provides a claim for relief
based on the injury alleged."), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
The Montreal Agreement provides that the carrier may not avail itself of the article 20
"due care" defense. Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.
21. MINUTES, supra note 2, at 22. For the passenger, the "contract" is the passenger
ticket. See id. at 19-22, 148-155; see also supra note 4; infra notes 22, 33-53, 81; H. DRION,
LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 54-57 (1954).
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parties, the Convention regulates the terms and legal effect of the
contract. Uniform rules respecting the documents embodying the
parties' agreement have been established.22 For the Convention to
be applicable the requirements of article 1 and article 3 must be
met.23
Article 1(1) states that the Convention applies "to all interna-
tional transportation of persons." 24 As defined by article 1(2), trans-
portation is "international" only when
according to the contract made by the parties,25 the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there
22. Block, 386 F.2d at 331-32 ("It is clear that the framers did not intend to endorse or
encourage bargaining between the parties. The Convention assumes the passenger's inade-
quate ability to bargain."). MINUTES, supra note 2, at 38-39 (Mr. Sabanin, U.S.S.R.:
"[Tihere is no other means of carriage where the inequality between these two parties to the
contract is greater."). Id. at 42 (Mr. Dennis, Great Britain: "In the Convention we propose to
replace a system of free contract by a system of law, of regulation, . . . [which] must be of
such a nature that they can appear in a just, equitable contract between equal parties placed
upon equal footing.").
The Convention adopted rules to be applied by the courts of the High Contracting
Parties to all contracts for international transportation. Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 75. The rules
allowed parties to rely upon the writing to determine their rights and liabilities. See supra
notes 4, 16. Decisions in the United States on the question of ticket applicability have allowed
passengers to avoid the Convention's limitations based upon a theory of procedural uncon-
scionability. See cases cited in fra note 105. Some courts have examined whether delivery of
the ticket informed the passenger of the contract terms, influenced by the passenger's inabil-
ity to read and comprehend the ticket language. See, e.g., Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, 68 Misc. 2d 402, 404, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971)(the limit placed
by article 26 on time allowed for complaints); see also infra notes 76, 130. Other courts adopt
a reasonable person standard and concentrate on ticket contents. See, e.g., O'Rourke v.
Eastern Air Lines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,367, 18,370 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Abdul-Haq v.
Pakistan Int'l Airlines, 101 Misc. 2d 213, 214-15, 420 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. Sup Ct.
1979)(distinguishing provisions which limit the carrier's liability from those which require a
timely complaint). See also injra notes 58-68, 113.
23. Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 74-75; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3. See
MINUTES, supra note 2, at 18-23, 35-36, 148-155. The Convention's goal of uniformity
specifically relates to the law governing the documented contract.
24. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1). The Convention's broad definition of
"international" includes flights within the territory of a single High Contracting Party. See
MINUTES, supra note 2, 246-47; infra note 53.
25. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2)(emphasis added). The passenger ticket
is the critical element in defining the character of the flight. The relationship between article
1 and article 3 is essential to clear understanding of the command of the Convention. See
Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 74-76; infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
WARSAW CONVENTION
is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power,
even though that power is not a party to this convention. Trans-
portation without such an agreed stopping place between terri-
tories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or author-
ity of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be
international for the purposes of this convention. 2
The use of the singular in the article 1(2) phrase "place of
departure and the place of destination" 27 was clarified in article
1(3), which provides that
[t]ransportation to be performed by several successive air carri-
ers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be
undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties
as a single operation,2 8 whether it has been agreed upon under
the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it
shall not lose its international character merely because one
contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, man-
date, or authority of the same High Contracting Party. 29
26. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2). "[T]he place of departure and the
place of destination mean the places at which .. .the contractual carriage begins and ends;
and ... agreed stopping place means any place at which under the particular contract the
aeroplane is to descend in foreign territory .... Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 81. For example,
Country A is a High Contracting Party. Country B is not a High Contracting Party. X and Y
are passengers sitting together on a flight from A to B. X has a roundtrip ticket A-B-A. X is
engaged in "international transportation." Y's ticket covers the flight from Country A to
Country B. Y is not engaged in "international transportation." For five hypothetical cases
designed to show the "inequalities and incongruities" in the Convention definition, see
Kennelly, supra note 2, at 88-93.
When the article 3 contract requirements are not met, the actual agreement between the
parties must be proven. See Block, 386 F.2d at 334 ("both the carrier and the passenger must
have consented to the particular route"). See also infra note 37.
27. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2). Each contract has one place of
departure and one destination. Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 78-79.
28. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3) (emphasis added). A series of contracts
is treated as a single unit only when both "parties" regard the entire transportation as a
"single operation." Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 78.
29. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3). Emphasis is on the common intention
of the "parties." Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int'l Airlines, 29 Misc. 2d 499, 500-01, 211 N.Y.S.2d
208, 209-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). The mere fact that there is a series of contracts including
one for "international transportation" does not make each domestic segment "international."
The carrier must know of the other arrangements. Stratton v. Trans-Canada Air Lines, 32
D.L.R.2d 736, 742-43 (B.C. 1962); see P.T. Airfast Servs., Indonesia v. Superior Ct., 139
1983]
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The essential requirement for applicability of the Convention
is the contract between the parties. 30 Each contract has one place of
departure and only one destination. 3' When transportation involves
more than one contract, the series may constitute only one destina-
tion if the common intention of the parties is to consider the trans-
portation as a single operation.
32
The Convention requires the parties' contract to be written
and delivered to the passenger. 33 The passenger ticket, which is the
contract, must contain an "indispensable minimum" of particu-
lars.3 4 Article 3 states:
(1) For the transportation of passengers 35 the carrier 36 must
deliver 37 a passenger ticket 38 which shall contain the following
particulars:
39
Cal. App. 3d 162, 188 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see also Hearings on Exec. A & B,
infra note 146, at 128-29 (statement of William F. Kennedy, Aerospace Indus. Ass'n) ("A
passenger who buys separate tickets is not subject to the Convention while on the domestic
leg."). Cf. Mohammed v. Air Can., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,023-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973)
(passenger exchanged tickets); Judgment of Mar. 26, 1969, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 23 Revue
Francaise de Droit Aerien, Jurisprudence 321, 323 (local excursion flight in Mexico held not
part of overall international transportation). One reason for the requirement is that the
airline consents to jurisdiction at "the place of destination." Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. 28; see Berner v. United Airlines, 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1956), aff'd, 3
A.D.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884, aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 70 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957);
see also Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 427 F. Supp. 971, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)(destination is determined by the ticket).
30. Block, 386 F.2d at 330 ("The applicability ... undeniably is premised upon a
contract."); see supra notes 4, 22; infra notes 33-44, 81. The ticket is the Convention
regulated contract between the parties. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114,
1120-21 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversed on
grounds that the treaty preempts state contract law); Glenn v. Compania Cubana de
Aviacion, 102 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 74-77. For a
discussion of the district court decision in Bali, see Note, The Interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention in Wrongful Death Actions, 3 FOROHAM INT'L L. F. 71 (1979).
31. See supra note 27.
32. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
33, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). For the contract to involve "interna-
tional transportation" within the Convention definition, the article 3 requirements must be
met. The document of carriage must be delivered containing the specified particulars. See
infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text. Delivery has been extensively interpreted. See cases
cited infra notes 105, 113.
34. MINUTES, supra note 2, at 150 (Mr. De Vos, Reporter: "[W]e have retained only the
indispensable minimum to be able to consider the carriage as international carriage in the
meaning of the Convention.").
35. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). The carrier must physically deliver the
ticket to the passenger. The term "passenger" is undefined. Delivery to one in a position to
WARSAW CONVENTION
(a) The place and date of issue; 40
(b) The place of departure and of destination; 41
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier
may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of
necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall
not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its interna-
tional character; 42
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers; 43
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this convention. 44
receive the ticket for the traveler fulfills the requirement. See Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299
N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955); see also Block, 386 F.2d at
334.
36. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). The Convention does not define the
scope of the term "carrier," which for the purposes of article 3 means the party with whom
the contract is made. One court has indicated that to bind the "carrier," a ticket agent may
need more than the mere authority to write tickets on a commission basis. See Qureshi v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 102 D.L.R.3d 205, 207 (N.S. 1979)(dictum). But see Judgment
of Mar. 23, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1976 Monatschrift fur Deutsches Recht 833,
reprinted in [1976] 2 REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME 324 (station which works with travel
company to issue tickets is sufficient).
37. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). The burden of showing that delivery
has taken place should rest upon the party asserting the Convention's applicability. See
Glenn, 102 F. Supp. at 634; compare Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d 398,
405, 434 N.E.2d 1060, 1062, 449 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695 (1982)("The airline is in the best position
to show delivery, having access to its own records and copies of tickets sold and actually used
for passenger travel.") with DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1198-
1200 (3d Cir. 1978) ("A requirement that an airline be required to prove delivery of a ticket
to each passenger imposes an enormous and costly burden on the airline as compared with the
burden of the individual passenger concerned who asserts liability in excess of the limits
permitted by the Warsaw Convention." Id. at 1199).
38. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see supra notes 4, 22.
39. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). The official French text states that the
ticket shall contain les mentions suivantes (the following provisions).
40. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(a). The requirement establishes where
the contract was made. The airline consents to jurisdiction "where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made." Id. art. 28. See supra notes 29, 36.
41. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(b). "The only determining factor [of
Convention applicability] is the place of origin and destination of the passenger as shown on
the ticket or contract of carriage." Hague Protocol To Warsaw Convention: Hearings on
Exec. H Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (statement of
Leonard Meeker, Legal Advisor-Designate, Dep't of State)[hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Exec. H]; see infra note 81.
42."Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(c). The international character of the
contract may depend upon this particular. See, e.g., Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 80. For an
example, see infra note 53.
43. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(d). When transportation involves more
than one carrier, each carrier's name must appear upon the passenger ticket. But see id. art.
8(e)(air waybill requires only the first carrier's fname).
44. Id. art. 3(1)(e). See infra note 58.
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The requirements ensure a standard form contract for international
air transportation. Furthermore, it allows for easy administration
and rapid determination of the parties' rights.
45
The prescription of article 3(1) is relaxed by the limited excep-
tion provided in article 3(2) .46 While the carrier must still deliver
the ticket containing the essential particulars to avail itself of the
limitation on liability, an insignificant "irregularity" will be ex-
cused. 47 The delivery sets the terms of the contract. Any subsequent
"absence" or "loss" of the ticket will be without effect. 48
45. The ticket provides the courts with an objective basis for applying the Convention.
See supra notes 4, 22. See also Poland, 535 F. Supp. at 838.
46. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence
or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the less be subject
to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id.
Mr. De Vos, the Reporter, analyzed the requirements of article 3 for the delegates: "The
essential thing, in this regard, is the sanction, . . . which consists in depriving the carrier who
would carry travelers ...without documents or with documents not conforming to the
Convention, of the benefit of the advantages provided by the Convention." MINUTES, supra
note 2, at 20 (emphasis added); see infra note 48.
47. An "irregularity" exists when the writing does not accurately state the contract term
due to a mistranscription or a negligent omission. See Collins v. British Airways Bd., 1982
Q.B. 734 (C.A. 1981) (article 4(2) "irregularity" in baggage check); Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at
82-85. When sufficient evidence of the actual agreement is introduced, an insignificant defect
may be excused. Id. at 82. The omission of the "agreed stopping places," for example, will be
excused when the international character of the contract is not dependent upon that particu-
lar. See Preston v. Hunting Air Transp. Ltd., [1956] 1 Q.B. 454; see also infra notes 108-12
and accompanying text.
48. Without a prior delivery of the passenger ticket, there can be no article 3(2)
"absence" or "loss." The party seeking to apply the Convention, however, will have to prove
that the requisite delivery has been made. See supra notes 34-44.
The exception provided by article 3(2), supra note 46, is designed to be narrowly
construed. The preliminary draft of the Convention stated:
If, for international carriage, the carrier accepts the traveler without having drawn
up a passenger ticket, or if the ticket does not contain the particulars indicated
hereabove, the contract of carriage shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of the
present Convention, but the carrier shall not have the right to avail himself of the
provisions of this Convention which exclude in all or in part his direct liability or
that derived from the faults of his servants.
MINUTES, supra note 2, at 258-59.
The Greek delegation did not favor the imposition of sanctions for omitting particulars it
considered insignificant. Id. at 303-04. Other delegations disagreed and proposed additional
particulars as required in other Conventions. Id. at 149-50. The Greek position prevailed.
"But the consequence was that it was necessary to be much more severe for particulars
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Thus, the interrelationship between article 1 and article 3
guarantees that the Convention's essential purpose will be
achieved. 40 Article 1 defines "international transportation" accord-
ing to the parties' contract.50 Article 3 requires that the vital terms
of the contract be included in the writing delivered by the carrier.
5 1
The interaction between the articles is based upon French legal
principles similar to the the objective theory of contract law. 52 The
rule allows parties to clearly establish their rights and liabilities
prior to the initial flight, and courts to apply the Convention in a
simple and uniform manner.
53
B. The Revision of the Warsaw Convention:
the United States, the Hague Protocol,
and the Montreal Agreement
When the United States adhered to the Convention in 1934,
54
the broad scope of its applicability was not fully appreciated.
55
imposed on the passenger ticket. ... Id. at 150. The formalities would be required except
in "Act of God" cases. Id. at 86 (Mr. Pittard, Switzerland, citing a rescue pick up of
passengers and goods as an example); see Karfunkel, 427 F. Supp. at 978.
49. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text; see also Hearings on Exec. H, supra
note 41, at 50 (statement of Stuart G. Tipton, President, Air Transp. Ass'n)(The contract
"must be written, it must be executed, it must be delivered.").
52. See supra notes 4, 22.
53. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
Application based on the contract also serves the drafters' purpose "to grasp the first
opportunity to transform a domestic flight into an international one." Sullivan, supra note 6,
at 8-9 (quoting De Vos, Reporter). Every contract has only one place of destination. Domes-
tic flights, therefore, are often deemed "international transportation" under the Convention.
For example: A and B work for the same company in New York. Both are going to
Chicago for a two day conference. While A returns to New York, B will continue his trip. B's
ticket contains the following itinerary: Chicago, San Fransisco, Portland, Toronto, Boston,
and New York. Due to the pilot's negligence, however, the plane crashes on its approach into
Chicago. Both A and B have a "destination" of New York. B's contract, however, contains a
stop in a foreign territory. Even if Canada is not a High Contracting Party, B's recovery is
limited by the Warsaw Convention. A's recovery is not limited. See supra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text. See also Hearings on Exec. H, supra note 41, at 49-51 (statement of
Stuart T. Tipton) (discussing the relationship between the ticket and the liability limitations).
The law governing domestic flights has never required international codification. See
supra note 17. It had been hoped that the international limitation of liability would be
applied internally through corresponding legislation. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
4, at 499. But cf. Air Crash Bill Would Allow Federal Action, 68 A.B.A. J. 1071 (1982)(dis-
cussion of proposed bill to provide for "fair and just pecuniary losses, including loss of care,
comfort and society," and establish a federal cause of action for domestic air crashes).
54. On June 15, 1934, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the Warsaw Conven-
tion. There had been no debate, committee hearing, or report. 78 CONG. REc. 11,582 (1934).
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Debate over the United States participation began soon thereafter
and has continued ever since. Critics of the Convention have at-
tacked the limitation on liability as a "barbaric ... subsidy," used
by the airlines "not only as a shield but as a club against the
passengers."- 5 The "felony" of the limitation is "compounded in
On July 31, the United States gave notice of adherence. On October 29, President Roosevelt
proclaimed the Convention in effect as to the United States. 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
Some have questioned whether the Convention is actually a "treaty." See, e.g., Ken-
nelly, supra note 2, at 98. The argument is based upon the difference between the broad
definition of the "treaty" under the principles of international law, see Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 8 I.L.M. 679, 681,
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 876 (1969) (entered into force January 27, 1980, 82 DEP'T
ST. BULL, May 1982, at 78, but is not in force in the United States)[hereinafter cited as
Vienna Convention], and the more restrictive definition in the United States. See RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF FORUIcN RELATIONS OF TIlE UNITED STATES 71 introductory note 3, at 74(Tent Draft No. 1, 1980), quoted in Weinberger v. Rossi, 102 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 n.5 (1982).
The contention is that the Warsaw Convention is not a treaty within the United States
definition because it was not ratified. This argument should be rejected. Bali, 684 F.2d at
1307 n.5; see Block, 386 F.2d at 337-38; Kalish v. TWA, 89 Misc. 2d 153, 157, 390 N.Y.S.2d
1007, 1010 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977). The Convention preempts local law and policy and must be
applied in good faith by the Courts. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308-09; Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at
1093; see U.S. CONST. art. VI; Vienna Convention, supra, arts. 26, 27.
The Senate's method of adhering to the Convention has left the courts with little
evidence of what the legislative body intended, except for Secretary Hull's general statement.
See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934)[herein-
after cited as Transmitting Message], quoted in Block, 386 F.2d at 327.
55. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 10.
56. The critics attacked the imposition of any liability limitation and not just the low
amount recoverable. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 534-35.
The authors examined both sides of the debate that developed over the Hague Protocol.
Id. at 534. State Bar Associations, insurance companies, law professors, and all major airlines
argued for ratification. They contended that adopting a higher limit on liability would
impede uniformity by discouraging developing nations from joining the Convention. Passen-
gers would be hurt in two ways. First, they would be unable to recover the Convention's
"international standard of fairness" in these areas. See, e.g., Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa
De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(plaintiff unsuccessfully
sought to avoid Brazil's limit on recovery of U.S.$170). Secondly, passengers would have to
pay higher ticket prices to cover the airlines' increased insurance costs. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 534; see also Transmitting Message, supra note 54. But see
Hollings, infra note 146 (Today, "the actual cost to the airlines for liability insurance is...
only 29 to 63 cents per round trip, and that's for unlimited coverage.").
Practicing attorneys and many Senators argued that the United States should withdraw
from the Convention. They contended that the drastic difference between amounts recover-
able under the Convention and the amounts awaded by United States juries could not be
legally, rationally or morally justified. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 534-35.
See, e.g., Bar Report, infra note 156, at 268 (dissent); see also 111 CONG. REC. 20,164-65(1965)(Robert Kennedy analyzes and rejects the proposed system of mandatory insurance to
accompany the Hague Protocol).
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that less than one-half of one percent of the passengers in interna-
tional traffic are even aware of it."57 The merit of the "regulated
contract" was outweighed by the injustice in applying the limita-
tions to unwary passengers. 58
In 1955, the Hague Protocol amended the Convention.59 The
limit placed on the carrier's liability was doubled to the equivalent
of U.S.$16,000. Article 3 was also substantially modified.60 The
change in article 3 lessened the evidentiary importance of the docu-
ment of carriage.0 '
Article 3(2) of the Hague Protocol includes a new introductory
sentence: "The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evi-
dence of the conclusion and conditions of the contract of car-
The argument has resumed today over the proposed Montreal Protocols to amend the
Convention. See infra note 146. The arguments continue to be raised by the parties, although
the American Bar Association's position does not appear to be firm. See ABA Reaffirms
Support of Airline Accord, 68 A.B.A. J. 1204 (1982). Those opposed to ratification have thus
far won the debate. See infra note 145.
57. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 535 (quoting Senator Capehart); see
Hollings, infra note 146.
58. The Convention's emphasis on the the passenger ticket reflects the importance of the
document of carriage in 1929. This is inconsistent with the current industry practices and the
trend towards non-documentary ticketing. See infra note 148. In response, the courts have
attempted to apply the Convention by rejecting a "literal" interpretation. See, e.g., Eck v.
United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59-60, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251-52
(1964). The issue is not what the treaty requires, but which purpose the requirement serves
today. Id. These ad hoc judicial amendments often do violence to the text of the Convention.
See id. at 63, 203 N.E.2d at 644, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 255 (Desmond, J., concurring). Courts are
not the proper forum for treaty revision. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1093.
A significant problem with the "regulated contract" has been the required "statement"
that the carriage is covered by the rules of the Convention. Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. 3(1)(e); see supra note 44. Courts have been particularly divided on the issue of
whether that statement is adequate to bind passengers. See supra note 22.
The preliminary draft of the Convention did not list the "statement" as a particular
which must be contained on the ticket in order to consider the carriage "international."
MINUTES, supra note 2, at 258; see supra note 34. Following article 3(1)(a)-(d), the draft
contained the following statement: "The passenger ticket shall contain, moreover, a clause
stipulating that the carriage is subject to the system of liability set forth by the present
Convention." MINUTES, supra note 2, at 258. The Japanese delegation, concerned that the
article's structure made the command unclear, wanted the "statement" to be compulsory. Id.
at 310. Article 3 was approved when subsection (1)(e) replaced the ambiguous "clause." See
supra text accompanying note 44.
59. Hague Protocol, supra note 2.
60. Id. art. 3. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. As ticketing procedures developed, the ticket took on less significance in practice
than the Convention had given it in law. The United States, however, still adheres to the
unamended Convention which has created problems for the courts. See supra note 58; infra
notes 126-59 and accompanying text.
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riage." 62 The required particulars were also modified to reflect this
change. Specifically, article 3(1)(e) was amended to require the
carrier to deliver a ticket containing notice that the Convention
may be applicable. 3 The legislative history suggests an intent to
allow each country to regulate the notice requirement.6 4 The Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), it should be observed, had expressed
dissatisfaction with the limited notice provided to passengers of the
Convention's applicability.6 5 Moreover, some courts in the United
States refused to bind the passenger to the Convention when the
delivery of the ticket did not provide him with a reasonable oppor-
tunity to take self-protective measures.
The United States government, however, refused to ratify the
Hague Protocol solely because the relief provided was deemed in-
adequate.67 In 1965, the United States threatened to withdraw
from the Convention unless the carrier's liability were increased.68
62. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3(2). See Hearings on Exec. H, supra note 41, at
50 (statement of Stuart G. Tipton). The ticket would continue to clearly establish the rights of
the parties to prevent disputes and the possibility of fraud by the carrier. Id.
63. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3(1)(c).
[A] notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destina-
tion or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Conven-
tion may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the
liability of carriers for death or personal injury ...
Id. See Canadian Pac. v. Stampleman, 72 D.L.R.3d 257, 263 (Can. 1976)("notice" means
"at least something which is in a form calculated to attract attention").
Other examples of this change in the role of the passenger ticket include the amendments
to article 3(1)(b) and article 3(1)(c) to require an "indication of the places of departure and
destination," and if the international character of the contract is dependent upon the "agreed
stopping places ... an indication of at least one such stopping place." See Hague Protocol,
supra note 2, art. 3(1)(a), (c).
64. Lowenfeld & Medelsohn, supra note 4, at 514.
65. 28 Fed. Reg. 11,775 (1963).
66. See cases cited supra note 58 and infra notes 113, 130.
67. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1087.
68. Dep't of State Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), reprinted in 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923-
24 (1965)(notice of denunciation delivered to the Polish government, effective date May 15,
1966); see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 546-52; see also supra notes 55-56.
The Warsaw Convention had achieved its two primary goals. First, the objective of
establishing uniform rules concerning the contract of carriage had been "almost fully real-
ized." Calkins, supra note 20, at 343. By the end of 1965, 102 nations had joined the Con-
vention, and 3 more ratified the treaty as amended only. A. LOWENFELD, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 964-69 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). Second, the Convention's legal basis of operation had
allowed the infant air transport industry to obtain insurance and investment capital. The
industry has expanded beyond the expectations of the drafters. Reilly, supra note 3, at 397
(analyzing the effect of the Convention on the carriers' liability exposure). Other reasons for
1983] WARSAW CONVENTION
An interim arrangement was reached in 1966. The day before
the United States' denunciation was to take effect, the airlines
agreed among themselves to accept a "special contract" increasing
their liability to U.S.$75,000 for passengers departing from, des-
tined for, or stopping over in the United States, according to the
contract of carriage.69 This interim arrangement, which came to be
known as the Montreal Agreement, 70 also included a CAB approved
article 3(1)(e) "statement" of applicability.
The United States government accepted the Montreal Agree-
ment and withdrew notice of denunciation. 7' The Montreal Agree-
ment, however, only temporarily resolved the problem of unreason-
ably low monetary limitations and did not modify the original
allowing carriers to limit their liability include the following: (1) establish an international
limit liability similar to that accorded shipowners; (2) spread the risk of liability; (3) allow
passengers to obtain insurance; (4) facilitate quick settlements; and (5) unify the law with
respect to the amount of damages. See H. DRION, supra note 21, at 12-43. A sixth reason is to
obtain the airline's consent to plaintiff's choices of forum. See L. KREINDLER, sUpra note 2, §
11.06 n.54; see also supra note 29.
Critics assert that the Convention has served its purpose and is no longer necessary. See,
e.g., Kennedy, supra note 56, at 20,165; see also Kennelly, supra note 2, at 99.
The district court in Bali, for example, found that the deregulation of the airline
industry established a new federal policy that the "vigorous airline industry [must] . . . stand
on its own feet." Bali, 462 F. Supp. at 1126. This change in policy, the court reasoned, allows
it to limit the treaty's enforcement. Id. See supra notes 22, 58. But see infra note 99. This
argument, however, misconceives the role of the courts in enforcing a multinational treaty
and was rejected by the circuit court. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308; see Note, supra note 30, at 76-
77; see also Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1093. Absent an explicit Congressional directive, the
court should not abrogate or modify the terms of the treaty. See Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 120 (1933); see also supra note 54.
69. Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 1. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4,
at 552-601 (history of the Montreal Conference). Cf. Poland, 535 F. Supp. at 837 (distin-
guishing special contracts). The French have viewed the Montreal Agreement as both a tacit
amendment to the treaty and a violation of the text which assumes that the special contract
would be the result of a negotiation initiated by the passenger. See G. MILLER, supra 4, at
185-86.
The limit is U.S.$58,000 without attorney fees. Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.
Other nations do not apply the Convention limits to an award of attorney fees. Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc., v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 354 (S.D. Tex.
1981).
70. Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 1. The Montreal Agreement allowed the
Warsaw Convention to remain intact "pending the establishment of more permanent ar-
rangements between the governments." Block, 386 F.2d at 325 n.1.
71. Dep't of State Releases Nos. 110-111 (May 13-14, 1966), reprinted in 54 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 955-57 (1966).
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Convention. Article 3's "regulated contract," as supplemented by
the CAB approved "statement," remained intact.
7 2
II. STRATIS V. EASTERN AIR LINES
Eastern Air Lines Flight No. 66 crashed while attempting to
land at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport on June 24, 1975.73
Two Greek sailors, Efstratios Stratis and Grigorios Georgakis, were
among the injured. They had been discharged from the S.S. Paros
in Louisiana and in accordance with their Seamen's Articles, Greek
Law, and the United States immigration laws, arrangements were
made for their repatriation. 4
72. The CAB approved "statement" of applicability in effect codified the Hague Proto-
col "notice" requirement. See supra notes 1, 63. The Warsaw Convention ticket requirements
remained otherwise unchanged. The consequence of this 17 year old "interim arrangement"
has been that the "regulated contract" has not kept pace with developments of contract law
and technology. See supra note 58.
73. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1975, at 1, col. 6. Eastern and the federal air traffic control-
lers were found negligent. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Airport on June 24,
1975, 635 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980). The disaster resulted in a 110 fatalities, a near record for an
accident in the United States. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, at 1, col. 4. At the present time, all
but six of the suits have been settled for an estimated total of U.S.$30,000,000. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1982, at B4, col 6.
74. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 409; Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Eastern collaterally estopped from relitigating the Warsaw Convention
applicability issue), vacated per stipulation, 75 Civ. 1511 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1981).
Eastern explained the plaintiff's arrangements:
[S]ince plaintiff was an alien, his entry into the United States was restricted [8
U.S.C. § 1282(a)], and his entry was only for the pupose of departing from this
country "on a vessel or aircraft other than the one on which he arrived." 8 U.S.C. §
1282(a)(2). Under the applicable regulations, plaintiff had to make his application
for landing privileges in person and the immigration officer had to be satisfied that
definite arrangements for plaintiff's departure from the United States had been
made. 8 C.F.R. §§ 252.1(c) & (d).
Brief for Defendant-Appellant Eastern Air Lines at 10, Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1982)[hereinafter cited as Eastern Brief].
8 U.S.C. § 1282(a) provides, inter alia, as follows:
"No alien crewman shall be permitted to land temporarily in the United States
except as provided in this section and sections 1182(d)(3), (5) and 1283 of this
title ... .
Pursuant to the applicable regulations [8 C.F.R. Part 252-"Landing of Alien
Crewman"] ... an application on Form 1-408 apparently was presented to the INS
office in Baton Rouge, by. . .the vessel's local agents... a D-2 landing permit was
issued to Mr. Stratis, and box IV, titled "ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPARTURE
FROM THE U.S. OF THE LISTED CREWMEN ARE (SCHEDULED TIME,
DATE AND PORT OF DEPARTURE, AIR CARRIER AND FLIGHT NUMBER
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The two young sailors boarded Flight No. 66 with tickets that
covered only the domestic flight with Eastern. 75 The tickets were
written in English. One sailor had a limited knowledge of English,
and the other could read only Greek. Olympic Airways, in a com-
pletely separate transaction, held prepaid documents in the New
York airport for the sailors' connecting flight to Greece. The Olym-
pic tickets, in contrast to Eastern's domestic tickets, contained both
the statement of applicability required by the Montreal Agreement
and a Greek translation. 7 The Olympic tickets, however, lacked a
date of issuance and a validation stamp and were never delivered. 7
OR VESSEL)", identifies the following transportation for plaintiff : "Depart Baton
Rouge Delta 412 0931/24th, Arrive Nola 0953, Depart Nola 1205 Eastern 66, Arrive
Kenedy [sic] 1545, Depart Kenedy [sic] Olympic 418 1915/24th" (JA 420a-21a).
Eastern Brief, supra, at 16-18.
75. Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 331. The two Greeks had identical arrangements pre-
pared by S.S. Paros acting through its agent Orion & Global Chartering Co. Id. Both
received tickets authorizing travel on a Delta Airlines flight from Baton Rouge to New
Orleans and Eastern Air Lines Flight No. 66 from New Orleans to New York. Id. See supra
note 74.
76. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 419 (Newman, J., dissenting). The Greek plaintiffs difficulty
with the language of the Eastern ticket influenced the district court.
Eastern also argued that the inclusion of the Warsaw/Montreal limitation of liabil-
ity provision ...was sufficient to meet the notice requirement . . . . [T]he Court
questioned "whether Mr. Stratis or anyone else for that matter, can be said to truly
understand what this notice provision states," adding that "[w]hile the airlines'
notice provision may certainly appear to be Greek to even a well-seasoned traveler,
it certainly was not Greek to Mr. Stratis," ....
Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 333 n.ll (quoting Stratis Proceedings, injra note 77, at 29). See
Moyer v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,081, 18,083-84 n.8 (E.D.N.Y.
1981)(Stratis and Georgakis found inapposite: the plaintiff in Moyer could read English). But
see Kennelly, supra note 2, at 93 ("All passengers-babies, blind people, and illiterates-are
theoretically bound .... ").
77. Transcript of the August 3, 1979 proceedings in Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 75 Civ.
1151, at 16-21, clarified in Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 331-332 [hereinafter cited as Stratis
Proceedings]. The parties placed significant emphasis on whether the Olympic ticket was
issued. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Efstratios Stratis at 9, Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682
F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982)[hereinafter cited as Stratis Brief]. The circuit court agreed with
Eastern that the ticket had been issued. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 409, 412. Issuance of an
international ticket, standing alone, is not significant. The Convention's requirements must
be met. Neither carrier delivered a ticket containing the essential particulars. See supra notes
33-44 and accompanying text. Cf. Adamsons v. American Airlines, 105 Misc. 2d 787, 790,
433 N.Y.S.2d 366,.369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)(issuance of a ticket constitutes a conditional
acceptance; plaintiff was not a "passenger" within the meaning of the Convention), aJf'd
mem., 87 A.D.2d 785, 449 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1982).
78. See Stratis, 682 F.2d at 408. The total award was U.S.$6,500,000. Sixty percent of
the amount was to be paid by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation for
malpractice. Forty percent would be paid by Eastern and the United States. Id. The Second
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At trial, both Eastern and the United States air traffic control-
lers were found negligent and liable to Stratis in the amount of
U.S.$2,600,000. 78 Stratis moved for summary judgment striking
Eastern's Warsaw/Montreal affirmative defense.79
A. The District Court Holding
The district court8" held as a matter of law that plaintiff was
not engaged in "international travel" because the ticket he possessed
authorized only domestic transportation. 8' The district court alter-
Circuit found the award to be excessive and plaintiff accepted remitittur to U.S.$2,850,000.
See id. at 414-17; supra note 8. Eastern, therefore, was liable for the amount of U.S.$75,000
and the United States paid the difference of U.S.$1,065,000. Georgakis was awarded
U.S.$1,000,000, see Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 331 n.2; but he too accepted a reduced
amount. 75 Civ. 1511 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1981).
79. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 408-CS.
Surprisingly, Stratis, who could not be affected by a limitation of Eastern's liability
because he has the United States as a responsible defendant, is the only one of the
parties who argues in his appellate brief that the Convention is inapplicable. The
United States, which had agreed to a split of any damages with Eastern, has had no
need to discuss the point in its brief.
Id. at 409.
The slip opinion language more accurately expresses the circuit court's surprise. "The
United States which has everything to gain from having Eastern held not entitled to limit its
liability, omits to discuss the point in its brief." Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, Nos. 81-6149, 81-
6167, 81-6187, slip op. at 3784 (2d Cir. June 30, 1982). The court's surprise suggests a possible
reason for finding the Convention applicable.
80. Stratis Proceedings, supra note 77. The decision has not been officially reported, but
was quoted and explained in Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. 330.
81. Stratis Proceedings, supra note 77, at 15; Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 332. The
district court's holding that the contract is evidenced by the ticket has a long line of case
support. See cases cited cited supra notes 29-32, 41; Goldberg v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 13 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18,191-92 (S.D.N.Y 1975); Kelly v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la
Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129, 144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Varkonyi v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense, 71 Misc. 2d 607, 336
N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), the court found that ticket's designated termini automati-
cally determine the applicability of the Convention. See McCarthy v. East Afr. Airways, 13
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(article 28). For the Convention to be applicable,
the contract must designate the international point of departure and destination, or include
an agreed stopping place in a foreign territory. See supra notes 41-42; see also H. DRION,
supra note 21, at 51-57.
The district court's holding is supported by the "textual approach" to treaty interpreta-
tion. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 54,
arts. 31-33 (adopting the "textual approach"); see generally Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines,
[1980] 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L.) (interpreting the Warsaw Convention using the Vienna Conven-
tion approach); Adede, International Law From a Common Law Perspective: A Second
Look, 60 B.U.L. REv. 46, 57-61 (1980)(explaining the "textual approach"). A corollary of
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natively concluded that the domestic passenger ticket containing
the CAB approved statement of applicability written only in En-
glish failed to provide plaintiff with a reasonable opportunity to
take self-protective measures and rendered the Convention inappli-
cable. 82
B. Analysis of the Circuit Court's Decision and the
Requirements of the Convention
The circuit court reversed the district court. The Second Cir-
cuit first established that Stratis was engaged in international trans-
portation according to article 1. The court then held that the
delivery of the Eastern ticket satisfied the demands of article 3.83
The following analysis of the court's decision will discuss the re-
quirements of each article separately.
1. International Transportation
a. The Circuit Court's Analysis
The majority of the Second Circuit agreed, with Eastern's bi-
furcated reading of the Convention articles to find that plaintiff
was engaged in "international transportation. ' 84 Eastern made a
interpretation is the "principle of integration: the meaning must emerge in the context of the
treaty as a whole." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 626 (3d ed.
1979). To avoid needless conflicts in the text, the articles of the Convention must be read as
supporting each other. See Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 246 (1893).
82. Stratis Proceedings, supra note 77, at 25-26; Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 333. See
infra note 115.
83. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410 n.4, 412-14. The circuit court's separation of the article 1
and article 3 issues created an unresolvable conflict between the commands of the treaty text.
See Stratis, 682 F.2d at 412; infra text accompanying note 112. The conflict, however, is
resolved by adopting the textual approach to interpretation. See supra note 81. The clarity of
the text allows for a swift determination of the applicability of the Convention and discour-
ages litigation of this issue. As the circuit court found, there is little case law on point. Stratis,
682 F.2d at 410-12. A major benefit of the Convention was to facilitate settlements. See supra
note 68; see also supra note 53.
84. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410 n.4. "We agree with Eastern that the undisputed facts,
especially INS Form-1408, to which the [district] court never referred, establish that Stratis
had a 'contract' within Article 1(3) for international travel. Acceptance of prepayment by
Olympic constituted the formation of such a contract, irrespective of delivery of the ticket."
Id.; see supra note 63. But see Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 332 (the Stratis district court found
the INS form and the prepayment not to be determinative). The Olympic document, which
lacked the date of issuance particular, was never delivered. There was no "contract" for
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two-pronged argument to satisfy the definitional requirements of
article 1.85 First, Eastern stressed that a journey from the United
States to Greece was "international transportation." Eastern then
argued that the requirements of the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) 86 and the prepayment of the Olympic
Airways ticket conclusively established that plaintiff considered the
Eastern flight to be part of an article 1(3) "single operation. '87
Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded, plaintiff's flight to New
York was "international transportation." 88
b. Analysis of the Convention's Requirements
The threshold question of applicability must be answered by
examining the "contract between the parties. ' 89 The definitional
language found in article 1(2) is complemented by the prescription
in article 3(1) that the "carrier must deliver a passenger ticket"
containing the essential particulars. 90
The Stratis court creates an unprecedented definition of "inter-
national transportation" by searching beyond the agreement be-
tween the parties. 9' The only contract between plaintiff and East-
ern was for the purely domestic flight from Louisiana to New
international transportation within the meaning of the Convention. Id. at 333 n.9; see Stratis
Brief, supra note 77, at 8; see also supra note 81.
Payment of the international ticket price may be sufficient evidence of the requisite
"common intention" but only when the payment is to the particular airline in question. See,
e.g., Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976), ajf'd, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir.
1977).
85. Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 4-23.
86. Id. at 7-11. See supra note 74.
87. Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 7-11. Neither party, however, regarded the Eastern
and Olympic flights as a "single operation." See Stratis, 682 F.2d at 419 n.7 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
88. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410 n.4; see supra notes 83-84.
89. Bali, 462 F. Supp. at 1121; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; see cases cited
supra note 81; see also infra text accompanying notes 117-20.
90. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see supra text accompanying notes 33-
45, 49-53. The delivery of the ticket is a prerequisite to the Convention's application. See
cases cited infra note 105. Delivery must made "prior to the initiation of the first leg of the
trip." Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d at 403; 434 N.E.2d at 1061, 449
N.Y.S.2d at 694 (late delivery of ticket containing notice of the Convention's liability limita-
tions is not excused); cJ. Fosbrok-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd., [1937] 1 All E.R. 108, 114 (K.B.)
(passenger not bound by provisions in ticket delivered well after the contract had been
made).
91. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410 n.4; see supra note 81.
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York.9 2 Eastern's argument that the Stratis trip to Greece establishes
"international transportation" ignores the Convention's uniform
rules which relate "not to journeys, not to flights, not to points of
journeys, but to carriage performed under one (or in cases falling
under para. 3 more than one) contract of carriage. ''9 3
Eastern argued that plaintiff's compliance with the procedures
required by the INS and the prepayment to Olympic Airways
established his ultimate intention to return to Greece. The domestic
flight, Eastern concluded, was part of an article 1(3) "single opera-
tion."'9 4 This disregards the Convention's use of the plural in the
clause "regarded by the parties."91 5 When the passenger's journey
involves a series of contracts, the "common intention" to regard
them as a single unit must be proven.' Eastern lacked the requisite
intention because it had not issued and delivered a ticket for the
international flight.97 Plaintiff, therefore, had two contracts. The
contract with Eastern, unaffected by the surrounding circum-
stances, was not for "international transportation.
9 8
c. The Result in Stratis
The Stratis definition creates many problems. In Stratis, appli-
cation of the Convention limitations based upon the fortuitous
92. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
93. Grein, [1937] 1 K.B. at 77. Interpretation of one article of the Convention must be
read in light of the whole text. See supra note 81.
94. Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 7-10, 16-23.
95. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3); see supra notes 27-29 and accompany-
ing text.
96. See cases cited supra notes 29, 32.
97. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 419 n.7 (Newman, J., dissenting)("Eastern had no idea that
Stratis was on the domestic leg of an international journey .... Eastern would have had
such knowledge if it had issued and delivered to Stratis a series of tickets for the entire journey
including the final leg to Athens.").
98. In addition to the want of "common intention," neither carrier had fulfilled the
requirements of article 3. Id. at 417-19 (Newman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 33-44.
Plaintiff, therefore, could not have been engaged in "international transportation" within the
meaning of the Convention. See supra notes 24-29 and cases cited supra note 81; see also
supra text accompanying notes 30-32, 49-53 and injra text accompanying notes 117-20. The
contract with Eastern was not left "open." See Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 57 A.D.2d 370,
395 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1977), aJJ'd mem., 44 N.Y.2d 714, 376 N.E.2d 929, 405 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1978). Furthermore, it was not "completed" by the subsequent arrangements with Olympic
Airways. See Briscoe v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 290 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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event that plaintiff was being repatriated grants the negligent car-
rier a "windfall." ' A carrier which does not regard the transporta-
tion as "international" does not have the opportunity to adjust its
insurance in light of the Convention's limitations. 00 The converse is
also true. A carrier which provides only domestic carriage would
not guard against the Convention's application.' 0' Moreover, the
Stratis court looked beyond the passenger ticket's designated ter-
mini to find the Convention applicable. Without an objective basis
to determine whether a passenger is engaged in international trans-
portation, parties' rights and liabilities will remain in doubt and
courts will be forced into an onerous fact-finding mission. Such an
examination encourages litigation. 102 The Convention was designed
to remove this uncertainty for the parties and to reduce complexity
for the courts. 103
2. The "Delivery" Requirement
a. The Circuit Court's Analysis
Article 3 of the Convention requires the carrier to "deliver" a
ticket to the passenger containing the essential terms of the parties'
contract. 0 4 Plaintiff argued that the requisite delivery had not
taken place, because the ticket for international transportation had
99. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 419 (Newman, J., dissenting). In 1919, Winston Churchill
stated that Great Britain's struggling airline industry "must fly by itself, the government
cannot possibly hold it in the air." 0. ALLEN, AIRLINE BUILDERs 24 (1981). The United States
followed this decree throughout the 1920's, but economic economic realities forced a change
in policy. See id., at 81-94; see also supra note 16; see generally N. TANEJA, U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL AVIATION POLICY 1-26 (1980)(charting the historical development). The success of the
Convention, and the deregulation of the airline industry, has lead one court to opine that the
United States has returned to its pre-Convention policy. See Bali, 462 F. Supp. at 1126. For a
discussion of this point, see supra note 68. The actions taken by the United States in Stratis do
not support this court's view. See supra note 79.
100. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 419 n.7 (Newman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 97-98.
101. Southwest Airlines, for example, is a purely domestic carrier without any interlin-
ing agreements. Southwest opposed the new rules binding it to the Montreal Agreement. The
carrier apparently wishes to avoid the possibility that a court, following Stratis, could find
that it was engaged in "international transportation." See 48 Fed. Reg. 8042 (1983); see also
supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 83.
103. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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not been received.' 0 5 Eastern contended that the Convention does
not require delivery of a ticket for international transportation as
long as the domestic ticket contains the CAB approved notice.' 06
Eastern, relying upon the reasoning of the court in the case of Grey
v. American Airlines,0 7 stated that the ticket's failure to specify
Athens as the place of destination was an irregularity excused by
article 3(2).°8
The Second Circuit in Stratis rejected the arguments of both
plaintiff109 and Eastern." 0 Hence, the court was confronted with
105. Stratis Brief, supra note 77, at 9 (citing Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1967), and quoting Bayless v. S. A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Grandense, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,881, 17,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)("Compliance
with the delivery requirement . . . is an absolute prerequisite to qualification for use of the
defense provided by the Convention." Id.)); see Stratis Proceedings, supra note 77, at 29,
quoted in Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 333 n.ll.
106. Eastern argued that plaintiff was engaged in "international transportation" ac-
cording to article 1(3) and that there was "no requirement in the Warsaw Convention the
passenger have in his possession prior to injury all tickets covering his international transpor-
tation." Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 14 (emphasis added).
Eastern relied upon the one paragraph per curiam opinion in Manufactures Hanover
Trust Co. v. American Airlines, 23 A.D.2d 832, 259 N.Y.S.2d 277, 278 (1965), rev'g, 43
Misc. 2d 856, 252 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964)(reversing on grounds that reliance on a
United States tax statute definition of "international transportation" was improper for Con-
vention purposes).
In Stratis, plaintiff responded to Eastern's argument by pointing out that in Manufactur-
ers Hanover the ticket had been "purchased and issued and delivered." Stratis Brief, supra
note 77, at 10 (emphasis added). Eastern, in its reply brief, stressed that the delivered ticket
gave plaintiff "notice," and then restated its Manufacturers Hanover argument making one
crucial change: "there is no requirement in the Warsaw Convention that the tickets for all of
the flights be delivered for the limitation of liability provisions to be applicable." Reply Brief
for Defendant-Appellant Eastern Air Lines at 6 n.6, Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1982)(emphasis added). The issue presented to the circuit court, therefore, was
whether the Convention required the delivery of an international passenger ticket for the
liability limitation to apply. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 409-10. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
107. 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd on the opinion below, 227 F.2d 282 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956), cited in Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 12-14.
108. Eastern Brief, supra note 74, at 13 (citing Grey, 227 F.2d at 284); see supra notes
46-48 and accompanying text.
109. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410. The court distinguished both cases cited by plaintiff. In
Bayless, the statement of applicability was printed in 4.5 point type. In Mertens, the
passenger received his ticket only moments before boarding. Id.
110. Id. at 410-11; see supra note 106. In Grey, the ticket omitted the domestic stopping
places and properly listed the place of departure as New York and the place of destination as
Mexico. The omission did not change the international character of the contract, and
therefore was an irregularity excused by article 3(2). See supra note 47.
In Stratis, however, the absence of an international point of destination on the Eastern
ticket was not an omission. The delivered ticket accurately stated the parties' agreement to
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what it perceived to be "conflicting directives" from article 3."' "If
the 'absence' of a ticket does not affect the eiistence of the contract
but the carrier 'must deliver' a ticket, what did the treaty-writers
intend? We do not know, and to answer the question either way is
equally arbitrary or reasonable as we see it.""12 The court was left
with a novel question of law: whether delivery of an international
ticket is a prerequisite for application of the Convention system.
Unable to harmonize the text, the court rejected the article 3 re-
quirements and instead relied upon its purpose as defined in Lisi v.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane.113
In Lisi, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
the purpose of the article 3 delivery requirement was to provide the
passenger with sufficient notice to afford him a reasonable opportu-
nity to protect himself against the Convention's limitation of liabil-
ity. 114 The court in Stratis explained that if plaintiff "had reason to
engage in purely domestic transportation. See supra notes 74-75, 81. Moreover, failure to
designate Athens as the international terminus would not be excused as an omission.
111. See supra note 83.
112. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 412 (footnote omitted).
"[The drafters] intended, just as they said, that a ticket must be delivered to the
passenger; thereafter, the absence, even the loss, of that ticket . . . does not impair the
contract of transportation or remove the limitation on liability." Id. at 419 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
113. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court,
390 U.S. 455, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968), discussed in Stratis, 682 F.2d at 411.
114. Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512 (citing Mertens, 341 F.2d at 856). The court held as matter of
law that the delivered ticket failed the Convention's "delivery" requirement because the
"exculpatory statements on which the defendant relies are virtually invisible. They are
ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting
color, or anything else." 370 F.2d at 514. The Lisi court contrasted the notice given with that
approved by the CAB, but suggested that the passenger must have actual knowledge of the
contract terms. See id. at 514 n.10.
No foreign court has adopted the Lisi court's interpretation of the unamended Conven-
tion's delivery requirement. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 98 D.L.R.3d 52
(Can. 1979)(the Canadian Supreme Court distinguished the case cited supra note 63, inter-
preting the Hague Protocol).
In the United States, the Lisi interpretation has been rejected, see Bianchi v. United Air
Lines, 22 Wash. App. 81, 587 P.2d 632 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), and limited only to "notice"
of the liability limitations. Molitch v. Irish Int'l Airlines, 436 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1970)(stat-
ing the rule followed by most courts); see supra note 22; see also Parker v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 447 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)(failure to understand "65.5 miligrams of
gold per kilogram" does not, as suggested in Lisi, invalidate the Convention).
In applying Lisi, courts have often taken an objective approach to define the notice
requirement. See supra note 22; compare Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, 531 F. Supp. 334,
341 (E.D. La. 1981) (the carrier does not have to show that the passenger knew of the
contract terms it need only deliver a ticket that gives him "a reasonable opportunity to
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know [that] his overall flight was international," the domestic
ticket would achieve the article 3 purpose."' The court stressed the
procedure required by the INS and the prepayment to Olympic
Airways, and held that "the passenger is assumed to know the flight
was international and the Convention does apply."""
b. Analysis of the Convention's Requirements
Article 1 and article 3 require the carrier to deliver the ticket
for international transportation before the Convention will ap-
ply." 7 The ordinary meaning of the treaty, read as a whole with an
eye towards its essential purpose, requires the contract for "interna-
tional transportation" to meet the particulars of article 3.118 This
view is supported by the amendments adopted by other High Con-
tracting Parties."' As Judge Newman recognized, the clearly ex-
pressed command of the Convention "is not satisfied by delivery of
a ticket for a domestic flight." 2 0 When the ticket for international
transportation is delivered, it must simply contain the CAB ap-
proved statement that the Convention may be applicable. This
statement has established a uniform standard of notice and is suffi-
cient as a matter of law.12
become aware of the limitation of liability provision") with Seth v. British Overseas Airways,
329 F.2d 302, 307 (1st Cir. 1964) (lost baggage case; the ticket provides the passenger with a
"blunt warning" to find out whether his carriage is "international" as defined by the Conven-
tion) and Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do sul, S. A., 245 F. Supp. 819, 821 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (non-Warsaw Convention case; passenger bound by the terms on ticket written in
Portuguese in that he made no effort to discover their meaning).
The Stratis district court, influenced by the plaintiff's limited knowledge of English,
held that the CAB notice was insufficient when contained on a domestic passenger ticket.
Eastern, therefore, failed to satisfy the delivery requirement. See Stratis Proceedings, supra
note 77, at 25-26, quoted in Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 333. See supra note 76.
115. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 412-13. This is a peculiar phrasing of the issue. If plaintiff were
engaged in "international transportation," within the meaning of the article 1(3), by defini-
tion he would be aware that his "overall flight flight was international." See supra note 29.
116. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 413-14. See supra note 74.
117. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3.
118. See supra notes 33-53, 81.
119. Guatemala City Protocol, Mar. 8, 1971, art. 2, 10 I.L.M. 613, 613.
Article 3(1)(b) requires the international agreed stopping place to be listed if the charac-
ter of the contract is dependent upon this particular. Id. See inJra text accompanying note
146. Subsequent actions of the High Contracting Parties may be examined as additional
support under the "textual approach" to treaty interpretation. See supra note 81.
120. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 417 (Newman, J., dissenting).
121. Poland, 535 F. Supp. at 838; O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,367, 18,370 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)(proposing English as a universal language to create a
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c. The Result in Stratis
The decision reached by the Second Circuit in Stratis, in ef-
fect, deregulates the Convention contract. 122 Deregulation imposes
upon the courts of the individual States the burden of defining the
"contract between the parties." This destroys one advantage that
the Convention's objective contract approach seemed to offer. 123
The circuit court's rejection of the district court's alternative
holding, however, demonstrates the court's willingness to apply the
objective theory with respect to notice requirements. 24 Without
considering whether the plaintiff knew of the notice provision, or
whether he had the ability to comprehend its warning, the court
held that the CAB approved statement was as a matter of law
sufficient to afford a passenger a reasonable opportunity to take
self-protective measures.125 This perpetuates the disadvantages of
the Convention's approach.
III. THE NEED TO REVISE THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Stratis illustrates three problems associated with the United
States continued adherence to the unamended Convention. 2 First,
uniform method of notice); Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 2; see Domangue, 531 F.
Supp. at 341. But see infra note 134 and accompanying text (questioning the adequacy of the
CAB approved statement).
122. Deregulation of the contract refers to the removal of the documentation require-
ments imposed by article 3 of the Convention. Stratis deregulates the contract by finding
"international transportation" without delivery of the ticket. See supra notes 58, 81, 84.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53; see also supra note 22 and infra notes
145-54 and accompanying text.
124. See text accompanying supra notes 115-16; supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 412-13. The court was not persuaded by the dissent, which
wrote that delivery of an international ticket should be required. Such tickets often contain
not only the CAB approved statement but also a translation in the language of the place of
destination. Id. at 417 (Newman, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 410-13; see also infra text accompanying notes 127-32. Three other
problems with the unamended Convention relate to its form of liability limitation. The first is
that only the carrier's liability is limited. See supra note 3. The second problem is that the
Montreal Agreement set the carrier's liability at U.S.$75,000. A fixed monetary figure cannot
continue to provide reasonable compensation during inflationary periods. See Reilly, supra
note 2, at 418-23 (suggesting that a workable amending procedure be adopted); see also, 129
CONG. REC. S2245-46 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)(statement of Sen. Hollings: "Adjusted for
inflation, the real value of [U.S.]$75,000 in 1966 dollars is approximately [U.S.]$25,000 in
1983 dollars." Id. at S2246). The third difficulty stems from the United States abandonment
of an official gold price. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. TWA, 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir.
1982)(declaring the Convention unenforceable in its present form); accord In re Aircrash at
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the circuit court had problems interpreting and clarifying require-
ments of article 3.127 The trouble stems from the Convention's
emphasis on a delivered passenger ticket. 28 The second difficulty
with the present system is the question of notice. 29 The Conven-
tion's approach has been rejected by modern courts that refuse to
bind the passenger to liability limitations based solely upon an
objective meeting of minds. 130 The third problem is the broad scope
Kimpo Int'l Airport, Korea, MDL-482 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONG.
REC. S2257-58 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). See also Boehringer, 531 F. Supp. at 352-53
(adopting the free market price as the conversion rate). In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit
stressed the need to ensure judgments of uniform value. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 309. This
was not the Convention's primary purpose. See supra note 68; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 16-18. Article 22 allows parties to "agree" to different amounts of recovery. Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. Many carriers have included the "special contracts" in
their tariffs. See 2 C. SHAwcRoss & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 139-41 (4th ed. 1982). The
United States, in accepting the Montreal Agreement, specifically endorsed the use of "special
contracts." See Montreal Agreement, supra note 1. As a practical matter, judgments have not
been of uniform value since the Hague Protocol. See Heller, From Unification to Fragmenta-
tion in International Civil Aviation, 22 Gm. Y.B. INT'L L. 292, 309-10 (1979); see also supra
note 2.
The purpose of the Convention was to establish the legal basis upon which an industry
could operate. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. The CAB has allowed airlines to
base their liability upon the last official gold price. See CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg.
1526 (1974). Adoption of the CAB standard would promote the Convention's essential
purpose. See supra notes 16-18. The multi-national treaty would not be abrogated or modi-
fied without the express command of the legislature. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
120 (1933). The courts, moreover, would not undermine the authority of the CAB by
rendering nugatory its decision. See North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emory Air Freight Corp.,
579 F.2d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1978)(Oakes, J., concurring). The CAB rate should be adopted.
Poland, 535 F. Supp. at 844.
127. See supra text accompanying note 112.
128. See supra note 58.
129. See infra text accompanying note 134; see also infra notes 130, 135-44.
130. See Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514; Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160,
168-69, 234 N.E.2d 199, 202-03, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 19 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039
(1968).
Under the Convention's objective contract approach, the passenger's subjective under-
standing is irrelevant. Cf. Thompson v. London Midland & Scottish Ry., [1930] 1 K.B. 41
(C.A. 1929)(illiterate bound by terms). A court's willingness to look beyond the ticket to find
a contract suggests that all factors should now be considered. Many of the procedural
unconscionability indicators are found in ticket contracts. Moreover, as "international"
passengers are left without alternative remedies and the U.S.$75,000 limitation bears no
reasonable relationship to the risks assumed by the parties, a substantive unconscionability
attack may also be made. If the argument is accepted, the carrier would bear the burden of
establishing that the passenger understood and actually assented. Cf. Bank of Ind., Nat'l
Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-11 (S.D. Miss. 1979)(lease agreement); Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971)(lease agreement); So-
franski, 68 Misc. 2d at 404, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Warsaw Convention article 26); see
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of the Convention's definition of international transportation.13 '
Application of the Convention to domestic transportation in the
United States often produces harsh differences in the amounts re-
coverable by passengers on the same flight. 132
The problems presented by the Stratis decision suggest that the
United States should reexamine its position. If the United States is
to remain a High Contracting Party, one of three approaches must
be followed.
A. Option 1: Continued Adherence to the Unamended
Convention
The first and least tenable option for the United States would
be the continued application of the present system. The require-
ment of a written and delivered passenger ticket would present
problems for carriers.133 If courts follow Stratis and refuse to apply
the article 3 requirements, the issue of notice remains. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently raised the question "whether
the notice required by the CAB is adequate to advise a passenger of
the effect of the limitation."' 3 4 In addressing this issue, the court
would balance the strengths of the objective approach against its
weaknesses. On the one hand are the benefits of a uniform standard
of notice permitting simple administration and rapid determination
of the parties' rights. 135 The supporters of this position would argue
that the passenger's difficulty with the language is immaterial.' 6
generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 336-47 (2d ed. 1977)(the
modern view of adhesion contracts); C. SHAwcRoss & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 126, at 29-
31 (Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977); S. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTs, 42-44
(1977)(ticket contracts); Spencer, Signature, Consent, and the Rule in L'Estrange v.
Graucob, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 104 (1973)(consent problems); Note, "No Hablo Ingles,"11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 415 (1974)(resolution of language problems, with a discussion of the U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (1976) and the California approach).
131. See supra note 53.
132. Id. If the United States had not been a responsible defendant, Stratis would have
been unable to recover over U.S.$1,000,000 in damages. Application to domestic flights has
never been necessary to achieve the Convention's purpose.
133. See supra note 58. The present system has many other problems which suggest that
a complete revision of the Convention is necessary. These revisions, however, must be
mandated by the legislature. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1093.
134. Bali, 684 F.2d. at 1313 n.13. The court left the question unanswered.
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
136. The Convention applies by its own terms without regard to the passenger's subjec-
tive understanding. See supra note 121.
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The objective contract approach achieves the Convention's essential
purpose. 13
7
Those favoring a subjective approach would argue, on the
other hand, that the drafters recognized the passenger's inferior
bargaining position,138 and that passengers would eventually need
insurance to protect themselves from the limit placed on recov-
ery.139 Without actual knowledge of the airline's limited liability,
the passenger is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to take self-
protective measures. 40 A requirement that the airline prove that a
passenger had such knowledge is consistent with the modern view
of contract law.'41
On balance, the advantages of the objective contract approach
outweigh the faults inherent in the present system except when the
passenger is on a domestic flight. 142 Passengers on a flight bound for
a foreign land are more likely than domestic travelers to heed a
warning captioned: "Advice to International Travelers on Limita-
tion of Liability."1 43 This problem is compounded when a passen-
137. See supra notes 16-23, 68. One of the most important goals was uniformity in the
law applied by the courts of the High Contracting Parties with respect to contracts for
international transportation. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Uniformity is de-
stroyed when the courts of the United States fail to apply the Convention approach. See supra
notes 58, 113. The United States, by adhering to the Convention, has modified public policy
with respect to the rule of contract law prohibiting agreements which abrogate or limit the
liability of a common carrier. CAB Order No. E-3230, reprinted in C. SHAWCROSS & M.
BEAUMONT, supra note 126, at D36-42; see supra note 68. But cf. Alaska Airlines v. Sweat,
568 P.2d 916, 926 (Alaska 1977) ("Regardless of whether such contracts [relieving responsibil-
ity] may be permitted by regulatory authorities, the traveling public is entitled to look for
protection to the certificated carrier . ).
138. See supra note 22. •
139. MINUTES, supra note 2, at 48 (Mr. Ripert, France: "[A]t the present time those who
travel by air have no need of special protection; if they have need of protection, they will find
it . . . in insurance!"). Today, passengers are in great need of protection against the
inadequate limitations imposed by the Convention. See supra notes 126, 132.
140. Passengers who are unable to read or understand the notice cannot be said to have
a reasonable opportunity to guard against the limitations. See supra note 76; see also supra
text accompanying notes 56-58.
141. Supra note 130.
142. The balance slightly favors the objective approach. First, a requirement that the
airline ensure that each passenger understands the liability limitation and is aware of the
need to purchase insurance is impracticable. This is compounded by placing the burden of
proof on the carrier. As one court recently noted, proving delivery of a passenger ticket is
difficult enough. O'Rourke, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,369-70; see supra note 37. Second, the
uncertainty in the law and the resulting increase in litigation undermine the Convention's
purpose. See supra notes 16-18.
143. Stratis, 682 F.2d at 418 (Newman, J., dissenting). This is the caption required by
the Montreal Agreement, supra note 1, § 2, quoted in Stratis, 682 F.2d at 413 n.10.
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ger is unable to understand the notice. 44 In the end, the problems
with the CAB notice are linked directly to the Convention's broad
definition of international transportation which would remain if
option 1 is adopted.
B. Option 2: Ratification of the Montreal Protocols
On March 8, 1983, the Montreal Protocols failed to achieve the
required two-thirds vote for ratification, but the Senate may recon-
sider the amendment.145 Ratification of the Montreal Protocols
would substantially amend article 3 without a corresponding
change in article 1.146 Article 3 of the original Convention would be
deleted and replaced by the following:
(1) In respect of the carriage of passengers an individual or
collective document of carriage shall be delivered containing:
144. A passenger must be able to read the notice to be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to take self-protective measures. See supra note 76; see also supra note 130.
145. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1983, at D6, col. 5-6. Senator Hollings led the fight against
the Montreal Protocols. See 129 CONG. REC. S2245-52 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)(statement of
Sen. Hollings). The Senator began his attack by emphasizing the broad scope of the definition
of "international transportation." Id. at S2245. He returned to this point later and cited an
example of the harsh differences in the amounts recoverable by passengers on the same flight.
Id. at S2246.
146. The Montreal Protocols are two related protocols, not yet in force, which incorpo-
rate all prior amendments to the Convention. Additional Protocol No. 3 Amending the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
Sept. 25, 1975, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 9147; Additional Protocol No. 4 Amending the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air,
Sept. 25, 1975, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 9148, reprinted in C. SHAWCROSS & M.
BEAUMONT, supra note 126, at A28-28A (status as of April, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Protocols]. See also Two Related Protocols Done At Montreal: Hearings on Exec. A
& B Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1977) (statement of
James E. Landry, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Air Transp. Ass'n)[hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Exec. A & B].
The supporters claim that the Montreal Protocols end two current problems. See 129
CONG. REC. 82259 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)(statement of Sen. Percy); see also supra note 126.
A new liability limit of 100,000 units of Special Drawing Rights (approximately
U.S.$117,000) is combined with a proposed plan to provide U.S.$200,000 in insurance. See
Hearings on Exec. A & B, supra, at 58-63 (statement of Alan M. Fergusen, Vice-President,
Prudential Ins. Co.). See also 129 CONG. REC. S2260 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)(statement of
Sen. Kassebaum, raising the Tramontana problem, supra note 56). Critics, however, attack
the Protocols' insurance plan and the limit on liability in general. See, e.g., Hollings,
Cheating Air Travelers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at 31, col. 1. More importantly, the
Montreal Protocols remove the "willful misconduct" sanction. A carrier's egregious behavior
will no longer prevent it from seeking the Convention's limit on liability. The removal of the
sanction significantly shifts the public interest arguments against the limitations, and threat-
1983] WARSAW CONVENTION
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destina-
tion;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed
stopping places being within the territory of another State, an
indication of at least one such stopping place.
(2) Any other means which would preserve a record of the
information indicated in a) or b) of the foregoing paragraph
may be substituted for the delivery of the document referred to
in that paragraph.
(3) Non-compliance with the provisions of the foregoing
paragraphs shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract of carriage, which shall, none the less, be subject to the
rules of this Convention including those relating to limitation of
liability. 147
The revision serves two purposes. First, the carrier's use of modern
ticketing procedures will not threaten its ability to rely on the
Convention.14 8 For example, a carrier which employed either non-
documentary ticketing or shuttle-type contracting would still be
covered.149 The amendment's second purpose is to ensure a uniform
ens the constitutionality of the Convention. In the end, the United States could play the role
of insurer. See Bali, 684 F.2d at 1311 (suggesting that the Warsaw Convention may constitute
a "taking," forcing the United States to provide the injured with adequate compensation). See
also 129 CONG. REc. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)(statement of Sen. Hollings). Without the
threat of litigating the "willful misconduct" issue, carriers will be more reluctant to settle
claims. Kreindler, Judicial Blows to Warsaw Convention, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1;
see Hearings on Exec. A & B, supra, at 94-102 (1977)(testimony of Lee S. Kreindler); see also
Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982)(containing a good review of the
case law on "willful misconduct").
147. Montreal Protocols, supra note 146, art. 1 (emphasis added). The Protocols are
designed to prevent courts from avoiding the Convention by creatively interpreting the
delivery requirement. See Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further
Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 519, 533-34 (1972); see also supra
notes 58, 113.
148. Montreal Protocols, supra note 146, art. 1; see supra text accompanying note 147.
See also Hearings on Exec. A & B, supra note 146, at 46 (statement of James E. Landry).
149. In shuttle-type contracting the passenger receives "a boarding pass at the gate,
with or without a reservation, and then pays for the transportation on the plane." Terms of
Contract of Carriage, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,681-82 (1982)(notice of proposed rulemaking). The
CAB would require carriers employing non-documentary contracts and incorporating con-
tract terms to deliver written notices to passengers. Delivery must be made either when the
contract is made or prior to boarding whichever is earlier. The notice of liability limitations
"would have to be of sufficient clarity and detail that the passengers would be aware, or
should reasonably be aware, of the main features of the terms." Id. at 28,682.
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application of the Convention. The delivery requirement is ren-
dered nugatory. In theory, passengers would be bound by the
Convention's liability limitations without notice.150
The problems inherent in Stratis would be codified by the
ratification of the Montreal Protocols.' 5' At the very least, the
Protocols should be revised to allow the High Contracting Parties to
adopt their own rules and regulations regarding delivery and notice
requirements. 52 This would threaten uniformity but provide some
protection for the passengers. For example, assuming that the CAB
adopted notice requirements similar to the ones presently used, a
carrier would not be able to argue that the Convention applied
irrespective of notice. 53
The Protocols, however, also leave the Convention's broad
definition of international transportation intact. This places new
emphasis upon the non-documented "agreement between the par-
ties." Courts would face the difficult task of defining "international
transportation," which would inevitably include ascertaining the
parties' intent. 154
C. Option 3: An Alternative Amendment to the Convention
The Senate's rejection of the Montreal Protocols suggests that
further negotiations are necessary. 55 Such negotiations should be-
gin by redefining the term "international transportation," thereby
limiting the scope of the Convention's applicability. Article 1(2), (3)
should be deleted and replaced by the following:
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. By leaving the definition of the article
1(2) "agreement between the parties" to the courts, the Montreal Protocols may inadvertantly
provide a means of avoiding the Convention's applicability.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25. The circuit court in Stratis and the
Montreal Protocols remove the Convention's documentation requirements.
152. The principal aviation agreement governing scheduled commercial services pro-
vides rules for departure from international standards and procedures. See Chicago Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, art. 38, 61 Stat.
1180, 1191, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 51 U.N.T.S. 295 (ratified by the United States Aug. 9, 1946).
153. Cf. Poland, 535 F. Supp. at 836 (defendant argued inter alia that providing 8.5
point print was in substantial compliance with the CAB required 10 point print and "that the
only penalty for failure to comply is a civil penalty of [U.S.I$1,000 . . . for failure to comply
with . . . tariffs on file with the CAB"). An amendment to the Convention must recognize
that passengers need to make informed decisions with respect to self-protective measures. See
Boryk v. Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
154. See supra notes 24-32.
155. See supra note 145.
19831 WARSAW CONVENTION
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, the expression
international transportation means any carriage which, accord-
ing to the schedule of the particular flight, originates and termi-
nates within the territory of two High Contracting Parties. Car-
riage between two points within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party is not international carriage for the purposes
of this Convention. 5
6
The proposed amendment would prevent the Convention from
applying to purely domestic flights. 57 The revision would obviate
the need for the courts to define the "agreement between the par-
ties" and to search for the parties' common intention.' 58
A corresponding amendment to article 3 should then be
adopted. This amendment would allow the carrier to employ new
ticketing technology, but would also establish a minimum notice
requirement.159 The following language would suffice:
156. See Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, 26 ].
Am L. & CoM. 255, 266 (1959)(prepared by the Comm. on Aeronautics of the Bar Ass'n of
the City of N.Y., presented Mar. 10, 1959)(recommending adoption of the Hague Protocol
and application of the amended Convention only to actual international flights)[hereinafter
cited as Bar Report); cf. Aanestad v. Air Can., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1975)(an
anomalous decision involving an open contract, the court interpreted "place of destination"
in article 28 to mean the destination of the particular flight), appeal dismissed, 549 F.2d 806
(9th Cir. 1977).
157. Bar Report, supra note 156, at 266-67. Application of the Convention to domestic
flights has never been necessary. See supra note 17. The Convention's limit on liability is
particularly harmful to passengers on domestic flights in the United States. See supra note 9;
see also supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. There is no rational basis for the harsh
distinctions in the amounts recoverable between passengers on the same flight.
Under [the proposal], equal treatment, so far as limitation of liability is concerned,
would extend to all passengers on an international flight (i.e., the Convention limits
would apply) and to all passengers on a domestic flight (i.e., the Convention limits
would not apply). The harsh discrimination which has resulted under the Conven-
tion as now applied would be obviated, a truer uniformity of judicial process would
be achieved, and the Convention's limitations of liability would be confined to
actual international carriage . ...
Bar Report, supra note 156, at 267.
158. The proposed definition "international" permits a certainty in application without
the disadvantages of the contract approach. See supra note 6.
159. Under the proposal, only article 3(3) of the Montreal Protocols' amendment to the
documentation requirements would have to be deleted. See supra text accompanying note
147. With the additional minimum standard of notice proposal, the CAB could adopt more
stringent standards. See supra note 149. Since the only passengers affected by the Convention
would be those on international flights, many of the present problems would subside. See
supra text accompanying notes 142-44. New procedures could be implemented actually to
warn the international travelers of the effects of the limitations.
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For international transportation of passengers, the carrier
must deliver a written notice to the passenger when the contract
is made or prior to boarding whichever is earlier. The notice
shall contain a statement that the Convention is applicable and
that the carrier's liability is limited. The statement shall be in
the language(s) of the place in which the flight originates and is
scheduled to terminate. A carrier which fails to deliver the
written notice shall not be entitled to avail itself of this Conven-
tion's liability limitations.
This article establishes a minimum requirement and shall
not prevent High Contracting Parties from imposing more strin-
gent standards.
CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention was introduced in 1929 to govern an
infant industry with a uniform rule of law. Application of the
Convention was based upon the passenger ticket. This approach
sought to broaden the scope of coverage and to settle the parties
rights and liabilities prior to the flight. Developments in contract
law and technology have rendered the "regulated contract" a relic
of the past. The Convention system must be revised. The Montreal
Protocols' deregulation of article 3 without a corresponding change
in article 1 exacerbates an already complex situation. Application of
the Convention can no longer be based upon an agreement between
the parties. By redefining "international transportation," the Con-
vention would apply only to actual international flights. Moreover,
by securing an adequate international standard of notice, new
ticketing procedures could be employed and passengers would be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to take self-protective measures.
If the United States continues to adhere to the Warsaw Convention,
amendments similar to those proposed in option 3 should be
adopted.
James K. Noble III
